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ABSTRACT: 
This paper discusses three scenarios concerning China’s recent trade 
negotiations and relations with the United States and the European Union. Chinese 
commentators and academics are sure that their country ‘is firmly on the path of 
greater integration with the global economy’ and that this is ‘a path that has provided 
great benefits for China and for the world in general.1
However, they are also be well aware of the problems associated with entering 
a global economy where free trade/level playing field market principles  have not 
ended either agricultural subsidies or import quotas on manufactured goods. Indeed, 
as argued in this paper, measures taken in the name of neo-liberal free market ideals 
have, ironically, spawned an ever-growing mass of quotas imposed by the EU and the 
US on the importation of Chinese clothing, footwear and textiles. 
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Introduction 
In this paper I will profile three scenarios concerning China’s recent trade 
negotiations and relations with the United States and the European Union. Chinese 
commentators and academics are sure that their country ‘is firmly on the path of 
greater integration with the global economy’ and that this is ‘a path that has provided 
great benefits for China and for the world in general’.2 However, they are also be well 
aware of the problems associated with entering a global economy where free 
trade/level playing field market principles  have not ended either agricultural 
subsidies or import quotas on manufactured goods. Indeed, as I argue in this paper, 
measures taken in the name of neo-liberal free market ideals have, ironically, spawned 
an ever-growing mass of quotas imposed by the EU and the US on the importation of 
Chinese clothing, footwear and textiles.  
 
The first issue I discuss concerns the charge made by Washington in 
2000/2001 that the Chinese government was subsidising domestic agricultural 
producers. This was a extremely arrogant move by the US government at a time when 
the United States (and the European Union) were already facing much criticism over 
their governments’ subsidisation of domestic agricultural producers. It was also a very 
effective ploy for further delaying China’s admission to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).3  
 
In the second situation I outline I again focus on the provision of government 
subsidies for agricultural producers, but this time the tables are turned. It is the US 
government (and EU governments) that have been accused by the Chinese 
government of providing subsidies for their farmers. This is an accusation that has 
long been made by a large number of other developing country governments. 
Moreover, US and EU administrators and governments are also accused of using their 
disproportionate influence over global institutions of governance (and particularly in 
WTO forums) to ensure that they can continue their practice of subsidising their 
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farmers and so continue what many charge is an unfair, inefficient, irrational, ‘trade 
distorting’ system. At the recent Ministerial Meeting of the WTO held in Hong Kong 
late last year (December 2005) Chinese delegates stressed that the behaviour of the 
United States and European Commission is unfairly disadvantaging Chinese farmers 
as it has many other agricultural producers in developing countries. Chinese delegates 
to the forum also chose to take a leading role in ‘actively improving international 
trade rule to protect vulnerable agriculture’.  
 
The third and last situation I discuss concerns the Chinese government’s 
recent and current negotiations with both the European Commission and the United 
States government over textile, clothing and footwear quotas currently levied on 
products exported by China and imported into the EU and the US. It is readily 
recognised that the textile, clothing and footwear export/import issue effects 
investment, government revenue and a ‘vast number’ of jobs in the European Union, 
the United States and China. An on-going log of disputes and much wrangling over 
tariffs has been a hallmark of the trading relationship between China and the EU and 
China and the US since the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in December 2004. 
The Arrangement had not been renewed on the basis that to do so would have 
contravened free trade principles. It was an internationally recognised Agreement that 
had long sponsored a system of quotas that provided developing countries access to 
developed country markets. Now the global textile, clothing and footwear market is 
considerably changed. It is much more fluid and while all the parties to current 
Sino/European Union and Sino/United States trade issues have been keen to announce 
to their constituents that ‘confrontation is not the answer’ to the evident tensions in 
their relationship, confrontation, jockeying for position, a lack of transparency and 
opportunistic decision-making have all been features of what is now an exhausting 
and on-going parade of one dispute followed by another. It is a situation that is 
resulting in an ever longer list of quotas imposed on imports of developing country 
products (particularly Chinese products) into the EU and the US.4  
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Scenario One 
The China-US 2000 and 2001 Agricultural Subsidy/ WTO Membership 
Marathon 
In November 1999 China’s leaders successfully concluded a bilateral 
agreement with the United States. This agreement meant that a significant hurdle to 
China’s already long-delayed membership of the WTO had been cleared. In other 
words, it seemed that China’s WTO membership was imminent. However, China’s 
road to WTO membership was not as clear as it seemed.   
 
In the period following the bi-lateral agreement concluded between 
Washington and Beijing in November 1999, criticism of the Chinese government was 
rampant. This criticism was effected by Washington congressmen and administrators. 
It had moved into high gear and it had moved from criticism of China‘s human rights 
record (even as this record was being ever more closely coupled with persistent 
criticism of China’s participation in the international arms trade) to again focus on a 
lack of proper protection for intellectual property rights. The criticism issuing from 
Washington was then combined with on-going criticism of the slowness of the 
Chinese government when it came to the opening of the tertiary, and particularly the 
service (telecommunications, insurance and banking) sectors of their economy to 
foreign interests. Finally during 2000/2001, Washington’s shopping list of complaint 
was lengthened still further. At the same time as China’s leaders were engaged in 
negotiating a bi-lateral agreement with the European Union that was to be concluded 
in May 2000, Washington interests were pressing for further concessions from Beijing 
and it was at this point that criticism of Chinese government subsidies to domestic 
agricultural producers became the focus of first their criticism of Chinese government 
policy and then the basis of their demand for policy change.  
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While the China-United States November 1999 bi-lateral agreement had 
included the Chinese government’s undertaking that it would not subsidise 
agricultural exports, during  2000/2001, it became clear that the demand that the 
Chinese government not provide subsidies for any agricultural producers would now 
be an added ‘price’ that China would be forced to pay for WTO membership. In other 
words, it was now not only a matter of the Chinese government not subsidising 
agricultural exports to the United States. It was a case of Chinese domestic 
agricultural subsidies across the board becoming a new Washington focus (a fad 
even). These subsidies became the focus of a demand for policy change by the 
Chinese government that was very effective in further delaying China‘s membership 
of the WTO.5  
 
At first glance and from the point of view of promoting Washington’s agenda, 
the agricultural subsidy issue seems to be particularly ill-advised, or, as a number 
commentator noted at the time, ‘openly arrogant’. Chinese policy-makers 
immediately noted both the United States’ and the European Union’s provision and 
persistent protection of a significant level of government subsidies for agricultural 
producers and this meant that Chinese policy-makers and commentators were easily 
and very reasonably able to portray the agricultural subsidy issue as yet another 
‘unreasonable obstacle’ to China’s WTO membership. They charged that it had been 
an unfair approach used by ‘certain developed countries headed by the United States’. 
They depicted ‘the price’ of China’s entry as having been ‘continually upped’ and 
they added that it was the Sino-United States negotiations, together with those 
undertaken with the European Union, that had proved to be by far the most difficult to 
conclude in a satisfactory manner. In the end, a second bi-lateral agreement had to be 
surreptitiously concluded between Beijing and Washington.6  
 
Unlike the fuss made when the earlier November 1999 United States/China bi-
lateral agreement was signed in Beijing’s Communist Party headquarters in 
Zhongnanhai, these second Sino-United States nuptials were quietly agreed to. They 
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took place in early June 2001. There were ‘no public handshakes, no press 
conference, no confident expressions that this was a comprehensive agreement...’ 
when the second agreement was concluded. However, the under-lying extortionist and 
bullying character of this second agreement could not be so easily hidden. Moreover, 
we can now see that the agricultural subsidy issue may well have resulted in a 
situation where United States interests had finally gone too far. In 2000 and early 
2001 Chinese leaders and WTO negotiators were describing the agricultural subsidy 
issue as ‘one speed hump too many’ on their country‘s road to WTO membership. 
And, it is this view that seems to me to best explain the apparent about-face, or shift 
in direction that took place among the China’s leaders and policy-makers at that time. 
They began to insist that their central concern was with the conditions of the 
acceptance of their country’s membership to the WTO. Their central concern was not 
with the timing of their country’s membership of the Organisation.7  
 
At the 2000/2001 height of the agricultural subsidy issue Chinese policy-
makers and commentators were repeatedly pointing out that their leaders and 
negotiators were exasperated. They had shown good faith by ‘earnestly abiding’ by 
the rules stipulated in the bi-lateral WTO agreements already agreed. They stressed 
that these rules included the Sino-United States Agreement on Agricultural 
Cooperation and they constantly reiterated their point that they had adhered to their 
stated programme for lowering domestic tariffs prior to admission to the WTO. They 
also added the argument that their government’s subsidisation of agricultural 
production had been well below that allowed for a developing country and they 
insisted that China is a developing country. 8  China’s leaders argued that their 
government effected an ‘only two percent’ subsidisation of its agricultural producers 
(a figure that is much less than the ten percent level allowed for a developing nation 
and a figure that is even considerably less than the five percent allowed for developed 
nations). They then further underlined the low level of the subsidisation of Chinese 
farming households by claiming that if the taxation drawn from their agricultural 
sector is taken into account, the rate of subsidisation was minus.9  
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Faced with Washington’s on-going criticisms and demands during the period 
between the signing of the first November 1999 bi-lateral agreement with Washington 
and the June 2001 signing of the second agreement, China’s leaders and WTO 
negotiators proved to be particularly obstinate in their insistence that their country 
must join the WTO as a developing country. They argued that as a developing country 
China must be permitted to offer subsidies equal to ten percent of annual output to 
agricultural producers. Chinese leaders and negotiators were publicly advising against 
moving from this line in the sand. They were also very vocal in resisting what they 
considered to be any premature further opening of their country’s market for financial 
and telecommunication services and they were particularly vocal when it came to 
resisting any premature concessions in relation to imported agricultural products. 
Their arguments stood as a bulwark against pressure from both Washington and EU 
based administrators for China to accept a developed country’s ceiling of five percent 
of output as a limit for subsidies extended to domestic agricultural producers. China’s 
leaders maintained that in spite of the concerted and on-going pressure they faced 
from United States interests they would remain true to their principle of only joining 
the WTO if they were permitted to join as a developing country. To do otherwise, 
they argued, would be to ‘trade off principle for the price of our early WTO 
accession’. They noted that it would court unnecessary financial vulnerability, and, 
above all else, they claimed, it would be disloyal to China’s 900 million farmers.10  
 
It is clear that the pressure exerted by Washington on Beijing concerning 
agricultural subsidies (and the attendant question of whether China would join the 
WTO as a developing or as a developed country) was successfully used by interests in 
Washington to extend the already long delay in China’s membership and it certainly 
added to the frustration, resentment and exasperation of China‘s leaders and planners. 
However, contrary to the view that most would form when first looking at the 
situation outlined above (Washington’s attitude has since been aptly described by the 
then vice-president of the World Bank - Joseph Stiglitz- as a ‘dragged out’ bargaining 
process based on the ‘unreasonable insistence that China was really a developed 
country’11), it was to provide China’s leaders with a political windfall. By arguing it 
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would be disloyal to agree to less than a developing country’s limit on agricultural 
subsidies, China’s leaders had been able to present themselves as the champions of 
‘their’ farmers’ interests. This was an important opportunity. It was politically 
convenient for China‘s leaders to be seen as championing the cause of their country’s 
farmers. It was expected that China’s agricultural producers would be forced to bear a 
high and disproportionate level of the ‘readjustment costs’ of China’s accession to the 
WTO. And, there was more to the story. There were at least two further issues 
relevant to this argument with the first drawing attention to an unexpected twist in the 
circumstances surrounding the issue. While Chinese leaders’ defence of their 
country’s agricultural producers was politically useful, from an economic point of 
view it was hollow. The Chinese government ‘could not offer a subsidy as high as 8 
per cent to its farmers, let alone the 10 per cent requested’.12 In other words, the 
Chinese government would not be able to afford to support farmers to the extent that 
WTO member countries allowed when a member is categorised as a developing 
country. And, there was yet another aspect to the situation and more political mileage 
to be made on the Chinese side of the delayed WTO entry situation.  
 
The second ‘political mileage’ issue related to China’s leaders’ ‘successful’ 
defence of their country’s status as a developing country. It began from the premise 
that China’s interests were best served by constantly re-enforcing and promoting 
China’s developing nation credentials. There are numerous examples where retaining 
developing country status during WTO membership negotiations, and later during 
post-WTO membership arbitration, over issues including the imposition of quotas and 
tariffs on goods that China seeks to export has proved to be useful. Moreover, China’s 
leaders’ clearly stated ambition to position their country as a developing country 
whose trading volume and political weight is sufficient to act as a counter-weight to 
Washington’s practice of tilting WTO regulations and standards in the United States’ 
and other Western countries’ favour (together with their refusal to back down over the 
issue of categorising China as a developing country) could be used to prove that they 
were leaders of a nation whose interests must be seriously considered. They were 
leaders of a developing country and they had presented their country’s interests in a 
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manner that countered, or at least checked, the interests of the all-powerful United 
States.13  
 
With their country’s WTO membership safely accepted, Chinese leaders and 
commentators were obviously very keen to advertise the point that ‘after arduous 
struggle, developed countries such as the United States and the European Union had 
to agree “to resolve in flexible and pragmatic fashion the question of China’s status as 
a developing country” ’. The agreed agricultural subsidy level to be provided by the 
Chinese government was 8.5% with the added reaffirmation that the 1999 Sino-US bi-
lateral agreement not to subsidise agricultural products for export would stand. 
China’s leaders boasted that ‘we compelled our opponents in the negotiations to 
satisfy our most fundamental demands’. Given that United States’ sources had 
previously argued that because China was one of the world’s largest agricultural 
producers, domestic agricultural subsidies should not exceed 5%, there was enough 
room for Beijing to claim victory over Washington.14
 
Scenario Two  
EU and US Subsidies Continue to Harm Farmers in Developing Countries 
At the December 2005 Hong Kong meeting of the WTO’s Sixth Ministerial 
Conference developing country delegates was keen to stress the harm done by 
developed country (particularly US and EU) subsidies. They again focussed on calling 
for the removal of agricultural subsidies provided by the governments of developed 
nations. At the same time Chinese government delegates promoted meetings that 
included ‘the G-20, the G-33, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries), the 
LDC’s (least developed countries), the African and the Small Economies Group’. 
And, the Chinese press celebrated a situation they described as ‘more than 100 
developing economies joining hands to press their rich counterparts to do away with 
export subsidies’. The Chinese hosts of the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting of the 
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WTO were taking their self-appointed role as mentor for delegates from developing 
countries very seriously. It is a role that they  believed they were well-qualified to fill 
(i) because their government had ‘won’ its 2000/2001 agricultural subsidies fight with 
Washington and (ii) because they could point out that in the four years since their 
country’s 2001 accession to the WTO, China’s overall agricultural tariff has been cut 
from 54% to 15.3% and is expected to drop slightly further this year - 2006 (this was 
in contrast to the world’s average agricultural tariff that stands at an estimated 62%).15 
Chinese sources were also keen to add that their country is the only developing nation 
among the five permanent members of the United Nations’ Security Council. This 
latter position is seen as evidence of China’s importance as a dependable (‘faithful’) 
player on the world stage. However, even Chinese delegates to the WTO who are 
becoming ever more seasoned in their role of promoting the interests of developing 
nations, found it very difficult to bring the United States and the European Union 
nations to heel. Compromise is the best they could have expected and this was only 
offered grudgingly. It was a situation that has led to a good deal of cynicism among 
developing country representatives and among a wide range of scholarly and public 
commentators. Previous arguments pointing out that ‘WTO decisions are taken in a 
way favouring the interests of the few over the many’ were re-enforced and further 
comment was made, including the point that ‘the rich economies cannot expect us to 
do more unless they are prepared to do more in relation to their agricultural subsidies, 
otherwise, instead of calling it [the Doha Round] a development round, we’ll call it an 
underdevelopment round’. It is comment such as this that must surely further 
undermine the claim of institutions of global governance such as the WTO that they 
are forums in which all can be heard and in which the interests of all are represented 
and fairly negotiated.16  
 
The WTO Doha Round that began in Qatar in 2001 has been judged by many 
to have failed and this view has, in turn, nurtured on-going and increasing criticism of 
the Organisation. The immediate assessment was that the Doha Work Programme 
considered and debated at the WTO’s meeting in Qatar (the same meeting where 
China‘s application for membership was finally successful) ‘was not the result of any 
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serious negotiation among the members of the WTO’. The Qatar Ministerial Meeting 
is now judged by many ‘to have failed as developing and developed countries split 
over agricultural issues’. The forum, like the Doha Round generally, has been 
increasingly recognised as having significantly exacerbated the imbalance in the 
WTO system. It has been widely portrayed as a meeting where ‘give-and-take’ was 
absent. It is said that the developed countries who dominate WTO decision-making 
had ‘just put up their proposals and ask[ed] the developing countries to accept them’. 
This meant that the next WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun in 2003 was 
unusually important. However, as has since been recognised ‘the US and the EU did 
not want to make progress with the ‘round’ [the Doha Round] sufficiently badly’ at 
this meeting. It has been pointed out that they did not want ’to face down their 
powerful farm lobbies at a time of slow domestic economic growth and generally 
uncertain political prospects’. (The 2004 US election was looming and the EU was on 
the brink of accommodating a raft of new member states). And, while the opposition 
of the developing G-20 group of countries to US/EU policy on agricultural subsidies 
was hailed as ‘a significant new development’ and evidence of ‘the global balance of 
forces’, the unity of the developing countries was not tested to ‘the bitter end’ and 
there were significant ‘flaws in the tactics of all parties’. Against the background of 
both the Qatar and Cancun Ministerial Meetings it is not surprising that as the Hong 
Kong meeting of the Doha Round got underway it was argued that if this forum was 
to be recorded as a success then ‘a new global trade deal’ must be reached. It was 
widely agreed among developing country delegates that the Doha Round would only 
be successful if ‘developed nations [finally] bowed to demands to lower agricultural 
subsidies’. It was also said that ‘success’ in Hong Kong may well amount to no more 
than (and no less than) action aimed at ‘salvaging the organization’ in the face a very 
real and present danger of its marginalisation.17
 
There were a range of issues related to the Doha Work Programme as it was 
constituted in Qatar in 2001, in Cancun in 2003 and again in Hong Kong in 2005 that 
emphasise the dominance of developed nations and their influence over WTO 
agendas and decision-making. For example, at the meeting in Qatar the developed 
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countries (that according to the WTO’s own figures were at that time estimated to be 
providing $US360 billion per year in domestic support for agricultural production) 
were promoting policy aimed at reducing protection and support for agriculture in 
developing countries. Indeed, Washington’s 2000/2001 charges that the Chinese 
government was not sufficiently wedded to free trade because it was providing 
subsidies for its domestic agricultural producers fits into this scenario. At the 
beginning of the Doha Round in Qatar the developed countries promoted the Work 
Programme’s specified aim of negotiating a ‘substantial improvement in market 
access, reduction of export subsidies and substantial reduction in domestic support’. 
However, it soon became apparent that the ‘substantial improvement in market 
access’ was intended by Washington and Brussels to only apply to developing 
countries. In a slightly softer but still similar vein, the demand made by US/EU 
delegates at the Cancun meeting was that developing countries must reduce the 
subsidies they provide to their farmers if Washington and Brussels were to be 
persuaded to agree to a programme for reducing the subsidies provided to their 
agricultural producers.18 However, by the time of the Hong Kong WTO meeting the 
tune of delegates from the developed countries had changed somewhat, but their 
dominant tone persisted. They now argued that they would not consider effecting a 
significant reduction in the subsidies their governments afforded their agricultural 
producers ‘unless poor countries open their markets for industrial goods [rather than 
poor countries reducing their agricultural subsidies]’ and when the European Union’s 
Trade Commissioner (Peter Mandelson) was subsequently accused of being reluctant 
‘to offer deep enough cuts in [EU] farm subsidies’ he replied that ‘we are going to 
stick to our position’. (He is reported as having previously stated that ‘the developing 
economies’ demand that EU set a date for cutting agricultural subsidies was 
unrealistic’ and that ‘if the European Union was to make concessions in cutting the 
subsidies, they [the developing countries] must also make some equivalent 
concessions’). He then reiterated his position that the ‘concessions‘to be made by the 
developing countries must be made in the area of reduced tariffs on the industrial 
goods they import. And disappointingly from many delegates’ perspective, direct 
negotiations with WTO delegates from the United States were not any more 
favourable. For example, delegates from West African cotton-growing countries were 
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asking that the United States (the world’s second largest cotton exporter) remove 
government support for domestic cotton growers. The same request had been made at 
the Doha Round in Cancun. (It has also been reported that in the period since China 
joined the WTO some 720,000 Chinese cotton farmers have been displaced from 
cotton farming as a result of US government subsidies). Nevertheless, Washington’s 
delegates were ‘refusing to give concrete promises’. Then, reflecting the call made by 
the meeting of delegates from developing countries who are members of groups such 
as G-20 and G-33 and who had called on ‘developed counties to completely eliminate 
exports support measures by 2010 and cut trade-distorting domestic support’, those 
promoting the Draft Declaration from the WTO Hong Kong meeting suggested a 
target date of 2010 to end all export subsidies. However, reaching a consensus on this 
issue was proving to be very difficult and time was running out.19  
 
China’s leaders, delegates and Hong Kong administrators clearly wanted 
success for ‘their’ WTO meeting. They therefore found that they were not only 
supporting other developing country delegates in their bid to press the United States 
and European Union to substantially amend their subsidy regimes, but ‘working 
together to push for “concrete outcomes” at this ‘international regime’s top decision-
making body’s meeting’. One ‘concrete outcome‘was the agreement among WTO 
members ‘to grant duty-free and quota-free market access to some 50 least-developed 
countries (LCDs) in the world’ and there was a last minute report of ‘some 
progress‘in non-agricultural market access’. However, even as late as a day prior to 
the end of the week-long Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, it looked as though it 
would be very difficult to report sufficient ‘positive progress’ to dampen criticism of 
the Doha Round and of the functioning of the WTO. Then, there was some last 
minute success that allowed the announcement that the 149 WTO members has 
agreed on the dateline for elimination of all agricultural subsidies and ‘developed 
nations had agreed to reduce agricultural subsidies in the near term in return for the 
opening up of markets by developing countries to manufactured goods’. In addition it 
was announced that the target had been set for ending the Doha Round of talks and 
reaching a comprehensive agreement by the end of 2006. The Chinese hosts were then 
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able to assure themselves and others that they had played ‘a powerful and constructive 
role’ in the negotiations that had taken place in the previous week. While for his part, 
the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy was reported to have stated that ‘the time is 
past where the WTO was run by the most powerful nations in the world. They can no 
longer do whatever they want. Developing countries have managed to create a 
balance of power’. (Against the back-drop of the hard fought negotiations of the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Meeting and the meeting’s final pale and shaky proposal that 
developed countries only need to honour an April 30th 2006 deadline to agree on 
cutting subsidies to their agricultural producers - which they have not done*, it is 
difficult to think that this statement was intended to be anything other than an ironic 
comment. However, I am sure it was not.) The US Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick simply called the agreement ‘a crucial step for world trade’.20  
 
A Third Scenario: There is More to China’s ‘Free Market’ Battles with the USA 
and the EU than Agricultural Subsidies 
In the situations I have charted in this paper to date the issue of agricultural 
subsidies has taken centre stage. It is now time for a change. In order to avoid giving 
the impression that China/United States and European Union relations revolve only 
around agricultural issues I will take the opportunity to briefly outline another 
significant theatre of trade conflict. Recently, in February this year (2006), the EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson announced that from April/06 the EU will 
levee import duties of up to 19.4 percent on Chinese and 16.8 percent on Vietnamese 
leather goods. The concession afforded China and Vietnam is that these duties will be 
phased in over a six month period. The penalty imposed is based on what is said to be 
‘compelling evidence’ that in both countries ‘there is serious intervention on an 
industrial scale’ in the footwear sector. The charge is that dumping into the EU 
market is occurring. The Chinese and Vietnamese governments are both said to have 
underwritten the cost of land-use through ‘inappropriate’ land valuations and to have 
offered tax breaks to footwear exporters. (There was also an interesting side-issue that 
came into play at this point. In order ‘to protect EU families’ children‘s shoes would 
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be exempt from the new duty).21  
 
From the Chinese government’s point of view an extraordinary amount of 
time, effort and expertise is being caught up in an endless round of negotiations with 
both Brussels and Washington over the import of textiles, clothing and footwear 
manufactured in their country. In a manner that parallels the need to engage with 
Washington in 2000/2001 over the accusation of providing subsidies to their 
country’s farmers, China’s leaders and policy makers find they must engage with both 
Washington and Brussels over issues related to the importation of low cost, labour 
intensive manufactured products.  
 
First Washington and then the European Union imposed quotas on Chinese 
manufactured textiles, clothing and footwear. Mindful of agreements made when 
China joined the WTO, when the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) ended in 
December 2004 the Chinese government imposed export tariffs on a large number of  
textile, clothing, and footwear products that would be imported into both the United 
States and the European Union.22 However, in the case of an importing country or 
area deciding to limit the import volume of Chinese clothing, textiles and footwear, 
Beijing made it clear it would lift the export tariff that it had imposed. Just six months 
after the end of the MFA, by June 2005, this had happened. Beijing had lifted the 
export tariff it had previously imposed while arguing it was moving ‘to safeguard 
textile jobs’. For their part EU administrators were imposing import tariffs and 
consistently bringing anti-dumping charges into play while maintained they were 
seeking protection from the substantially increased flow of Chinese imports into their 
member states in order to avoid significant damage to not only its domestic textile 
manufacturing industry, but also to textile manufacturers of other developing 
countries.  
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The Multi-Fibre Arrangement with its long established apportioning of textile 
production among developing countries through the use of a system that allocated 
quotas for developed country, and particularly US and EU, markets had been expected 
to trigger a number of new arrangements once it had run its course and this has 
happened. With the end of the MFA drawing ever closer, scholars were keen to 
comment on the effect that the end of the Arrangement would have on China’s labour 
intensive textile, clothing and footwear sector. Comment such as the following was 
both well informed and usual. First it was noted that ‘in the case of textiles and 
clothing, restrictive trade arrangements [under the MFA] may not offer any significant 
expansion for China’s exports and employment immediately after China’s entry into 
the WTO [moreover] those who are optimistic about an expansion of these exports 
assume, rather unrealistically, that the abolition of Multi-Fibre Arrangement will have 
immediate favourable effects on China’s exports’. They then pressed their argument 
further by recognising that ‘under the terms of the transitional product-specific 
safeguard clause in China’s Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization, it 
will be fairly easy for the United States and other countries [including EU countries] 
to impose restrictions on goods imported from China’.23 What has happened is that 
China’s exports of clothing and footwear to both the European Union and the United 
States has risen significantly since the end of the MFA. In one particularly note-
worthy case the European Commission reported that ‘statistics showed a rise on 
average of 700 percent in import volumes and a 28 percent drop in prices for six 
categories of leather and fabric shoes’ since the end of the Arrangement and it was not 
only shoes that were imported into the EU in substantially increased volume. For 
example, the EU claimed that ‘T’ shirt imports from China rose 187 percent in the 
first four months after the end of the MFA [in the first four months of last year - 2005] 
and imports of flax yarn rose 56% year-on-year.24 However, at the other end of this 
equation what has happened is that it has proved to be ‘fairly easy’ for the EU and the 
US to impose restrictions on the importation of these goods.  
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The ease at which both Washington and Brussels can impose restrictions on 
apparel and footwear manufactured in China has resulted in the Chinese government 
issuing defensive statements. For example, at the point at which the MFA expired 
Chinese sources issued a statement titled ‘China’s Textiles Not a Threat’. This 
statement warned that people, with their own interests in mind ‘point fingers at China’ 
and the result is that ‘more [people] are manipulated into believing that China will 
become a dangerous giant dominating the world market as soon as the [MFA] textile 
quota is phased out. The theory... [maintains] that jobs and money will flow to China, 
threatening fair trade as well as the interests of other countries’. This is not the case’. 
Similar articles pointed to China’s intention to effect a ‘smooth transition of textile 
[and clothing and footwear] integration’. For their part, European Union 
administrators announced that they would establish a special monitoring system for 
textile and clothing imports because ‘textile-producing nations would face market 
dominance by China as soon as quotas disappeared’. However, in the United States 
somewhat different approach came quickly to the fore. Just months after the end of 
the MFA the American Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel filed a case 
in the United States Court of International Trade with the intention of blocking the 
Commerce Department of the US government from ‘imposing curbs on China’s 
textiles’. It seems that a month before (in February 2005) the Commerce Department 
had listened to the concerns of textile makers in the United States and had said ‘it 
would consider separate restrictions on the 1.3-billion-dollar-US-dollar clothing 
imports from China’. As the Chinese press was quick to point out, in this instance 
tension had immediately been manifest between United States textile and clothing 
retailers and manufacturers25  
 
To date, there have been quotas imposed on a range of imports from China 
into both the  European Union and the United States and the tension within the United 
States between retailers such as Wal-Mart that are keen to offer low priced consumer 
products and local manufacturers has persisted while manufacturer/retailer/consumer 
tension has also been a key feature of debate within the European Union where top 
retailers such as France‘s Carrefour have objected to restrictions placed on Chinese 
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manufactured textiles, clothing and footwear. However, this type of objection has met 
with only limited success. Within just the first four months after the end of the MFA 
the European Commission had threatened to launch investigations into at least ten 
categories of Chinese textiles and since then there have been on-going moves and 
threats to impose more and more quotas together with the launching of a steady 
stream of actions based on charges of dumping by Chinese manufacturers onto the EU 
and US markets. And, as I have noted, in the United States it was only two months 
after the end of the MFA that calls went out to quota textile imports from China. 
There were similar calls to activate a series of measures including accusations of 
dumping. This was to be done on the basis that unless action was taken there would 
be the loss of at least 650,000 American manufacturing jobs.26  
 
As the trade negotiation ‘game’ played between the Chinese government and 
European Union administrators and the Chinese and United States governments 
continues on it is obviously causing difficulty on a number of fronts. We have seen 
goods piled on wharves because quotas that have been imposed (but not well 
publicised or clearly calculated) have been exhausted. European retailers and Chinese 
producers then howled with indignation over what they recognised as mishandling 
and lack of transparency when it came to issues associated with China’s export of 
textiles, clothing and footwear into the EU and US domestic markets. This situation 
was eventually resolved by, it was said, the sincerity displayed by the Chinese and 
European Union sides in the dispute and their willingness to resolve the issue through 
negotiation. At the same time as this was happening the United States government 
was imposing limits on the import of seven categories of clothing manufactured in 
China and was undertaking what it calls ‘safeguard investigations’ in relation to a 
further six categories of imported garments. While on the China/EU front the practice 
of ignoring the need for transparency seems to have persisted. There were ‘no specific 
figures’ immediately made publicly available after the China/European Union dispute 
had been settled. While on-going China/United States quota negotiations appear to be 
reasonably open (complete with Chinese companies ‘rushing to meet their export 
orders before the United States’ border closes to them’ as a result of quota imposition) 
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all that was made public in relation to the China/EU negotiations was that there had 
been a commitment that ‘the rate of increase of certain textile exports will be fixed’ 
by the end of 2007. It was then noted that rates of increase will be adjusted in both 
2006 and 2007 and that ‘a completely free textile trade deal will be in place by 2008’. 
This agreement was hammered out in mid June 2005. However, two weeks previously 
the EU had taken a dispute to the WTO. This was a move that would allow the EU to 
restrict imports of selected Chinese products ‘to an annual growth rate of 7.5 percent 
if Chinese efforts to restrict shipments do not satisfy EU members’. And, satisfying 
EU members has proved to be difficult. Not surprisingly, European stake-holders 
were unimpressed when large quantities of textiles and garments were blocked by EU 
customs. There was not only talk of ‘bad practices’, but also of product in the process 
of shipment not accounted for under quota arrangements; of suppliers rushing to put 
their goods into transit in the expectation that once it landed on European docks they 
would be cleared; and there was enormous pressure from European retailers and 
importers who almost all agreed with the trade ministers of the Netherlands, Germany 
and Sweden who argued that ‘the best solution to the crisis was to renounce protective 
trade measures’. 27  While many aspects of the European wharf issue were well 
publicised, there are other far less dramatic, but important and far-reaching effects of 
the present trade wars. For example, one of the most damaging aspects in relation to 
the Chinese government is that, like the earlier debacle over the question of whether 
the Chinese government was subsidising the country’s farmers and whether or not 
China is a developed or developing country, time, effort and expertise is drained away 
from other matters in order to effectively negotiate with both Brussels and 
Washington and particularly when cases are taken to the World Trade Organisation 
for arbitration. 
 
Conclusion  
The three scenarios I have outlined and discussed above have been given from 
a Chinese government and Chinese producers’ perspective. I have not attempted to 
‘tell the tale’ from the point of view of either the United States, the European 
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Commission or European Union governments or consumers. However, I have sought 
to tell this tale against the back-drop of neo-liberal measures to promote free trade and 
global market integration actively and aggressively promoted by the US and EU 
governments. The latter is a project that has not persuaded the US or the countries of 
the EU to give up the subsidies they pay their rural producers and has led to a 
bewildering, ever-increasing and fluid range of import quotas being imposed on 
Chinese products imported to their shores. 
 
In the first scenario I present in this paper I have investigated a situation where 
the Chinese government found it must negotiate with the United States government 
over the provision of subsidies to its agricultural producers even when (i) a Sino-
United States bi-lateral agreement (that included provision for agricultural exports 
free of subsidies) had been finalised and was expected to clear the way for China’s 
membership of the WTO; (ii) when those in Washington who had expressed an 
interest in impeding China’s passage to WTO membership had little or no proof of the 
Chinese government providing subsidies to agricultural producers; and (iii) when the 
United States was already under considerable pressure from members of the WTO 
(particularly developing country members of the Organisation) to restrict the 
significant agricultural subsidies it affords American farmers. Chinese government 
leaders, policy-makers and commentators resented the United States’ approach and a 
significant number within their ranks argued that the agricultural subsidy issue 
represented ‘one hump too many’ on their country’s road to WTO accession. It was 
only at the eleventh hour (in June 2001) that a second Sino-US bi-lateral agreement 
was quietly signed and though the Chinese government still had to agree to a bi-lateral 
agreement with Mexico, the way was essentially and finally cleared for China’s 
membership of the WTO.28
 
In the second account that I have offered above I have taken up an issue that 
came to the fore while I was investigating the escalating ‘price’ the United States 
government extracted for China’s membership of the WTO. While I was investigating 
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the 2000/2001 delay in China’s accession to the Organisation it became clear that not 
everything that happened was detrimental from the point of view of the China’s 
leaders. They were able to present themselves as protectors of their country’s farmers. 
They had also been put in a position where they could claim they had successfully 
opposed the power of the United States government and thus had credentials that 
would make them worthy leaders of developing countries’ fight to extract improved 
trading arrangements from developed nations (particularly the United States and the 
European Union). And, this was a role that China’s WTO delegates were to take very 
seriously when they and their Hong Kong administrator colleagues hosted the Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong in December last year (2005). A lot 
was at stake.  
 
Since the beginning of the Doha Round of the WTO in Qatar in 2001 (the 
same meeting that finally admitted China as a WTO member) the Organisation had 
been facing charges of having failed in its advertised role as an impartial institution of 
global governance. The Qatar meeting of the WTO had been widely recognised as 
having ‘enhanced the imbalance in the WTO system significantly’. It was widely 
portrayed as a meeting where ‘give-and-take’ was absent. This was an impression that 
in many respects was left simmering by the outcome of 2003 Cancun Ministerial 
Meeting, where even though the group of developing G20 countries had (with the 
support of countries from the ACP, the Africa Group and the LDCs) managed to 
block the preferred US/EU stance on agricultural subsidies and there was much 
subsequent talk of the increased cohesion and power of developing countries in terms 
of opposing the US and the EU in the WTO‘s forum, it was widely believed that the 
meeting had failed to engineer a successful outcome from its labours. There was a 
general feeling that the Doha Round had stalled, even failed. It was this situation that 
subsequently led to the view that the Ministerial Meeting hosted by the Chinese 
government and held in Hong Kong in 2005 must reach ‘a new global trade deal’ 
accepted and agreed by all, or at least a majority of member states, including and 
particularly, the large number of developing countries. Prior to the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Meeting there had even been talk of the very real danger of the WTO’s 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2006- 8 
 
21
marginalisation and loss of global administrative relevance.  
 
In the third and last scenario I have discussed I have set myself the task of 
taking another (non-agricultural) approach to issues associated with China/United 
States/European Union trading arrangements. When in the name of free market 
orthodoxy the Multi-Fibre Arrangement was allowed to expire without being replaced 
by further agreed and settled arrangements for quotas for the import of textiles, 
clothing and footwear into the European Union and the United States, trade disputes, 
manipulation and negotiation escalated between the Chinese government and its two 
largest trading partners. China’s textile, clothing and footwear exports also escalated. 
They increased substantially and now a new regime of import quotas has been 
established, but it is a much more fluid regime than the one that existed under the 
embedded, long-standing and much more predictable processes established under the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Many countries who have been promoting and hosting 
textile, clothing and footwear manufacture (often for some considerable time) have 
seen investors in their industries re-locate to China while, for its part, the Chinese 
government finds it must deal with the effects of this largely unsolicited, though 
expected, re-location. The ability to negotiate and facilitate the best possible 
arrangements for exporters has proved to be an essential part of managing the new 
post-MFA situation. However, it has not been without cost. The Chinese government 
has found that it must spend considerable effort, resources, expertise and time in order 
to address the on-going cavalcade of trade disputes triggered by the substantial 
increase in their country’s export of labour-intensive textile, clothing and footwear 
manufacture into the domestic markets of the European Union and the United States.  
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1 See China & World Economy (published by the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences), Vol. 13, No. 4, Jul-Aug 2005, p. 16 
 
2 See China & World Economy (published by the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences), Vol. 13, No. 4, Jul-Aug 2005, p. 16 
 
3 It is noteworthy that it was only ‘after 15 arduous years as a candidate [that] China’s application for 
membership in the World Trade Organization was accepted at the WTO’s Doha ministerial meeting in 
November 2001’. See Deepak Bhattasali, Shantong Li and Will Martin, editors, China and the WTO, 
World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2004,  p. 1 
 
4 See ‘Solve Trade Disputes via Dialogue’, China Daily [in English], 25/02/2006 
 
5  Chinese commentators were by no means alone in taking this view. For example, Joseph Stiglitz 
(chief economist and senior vice-president of the World Bank) later noted ‘the hypocrisy of those 
pushing for trade liberalization - and the way they have pushed it..’. He went on to add (as many others 
have done) that ‘the Western countries [particularly the United States] pushed trade liberalization for 
the products they exported, but at the same time continued to protect those sectors in which 
competition from developing countries might have threatened [or at least have had the potential to 
reduce benefit to] their economies...’ Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization And Its Discontents, Allen Lane 
and Penguin Press, 2002, p. 60. See also Supachai Panitchpakdi and Mark L. Clifford, China and the 
WTO, John Wiley and Sons, 2002, op. cit., pp. 70-1 
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6   See Holbig and Ash, editors, China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization, 
Routledge/Curzon, 2002, pp. 14-15 and p. 36; Panitchpakdi and Clifford, op. cit., pp. 69-73; and 
‘Renmin Ribao Reviews WTO Process, Pros, Cons of Membership’, Renmin Ribao, 14/11/2001 
 
7  ‘Renmin Ribao Reviews WTO Process, Pros, Cons of Membership’, op. cit., and Panitchpakdi and 
Clifford, op. cit., pp. 72-3 and 78-9 
 
8  ‘Certain Issues About China’s WTO Accession - Long Yongtu Speaks Frankly About the Thorny 
Issues in China’s [WTO] Accession’,  Hong Kong published Ta Kung Pao (Internet version), 
23/03/2002  
 
9   In line with the proposition that government assistance to the agricultural sector should increase, in 
2000 government expenditure for agriculture totalled 21.705 billion yuan. This was presented as an 
increase of 50.9 per cent over the previous year. See ‘Comparison of Full Text of Xiang Huaicheng’s 
[Minister of Finance] Budget Report’, Xinhua, 18/03/2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0319. See also ‘Certain 
Issues About China’s WTO Accession..., op. cit. 
 
10   See ‘Certain Issues About China’s WTO Accession..., op. cit. and ‘China, US Reported Riding a 
Smooth Path to WTO’, China Daily (in English), 10/06/2001. European Union countries and member 
countries of the Cairns group, including Australia, also pressed for a lower ceiling for China’s 
agricultural subsidies:     i. e., a ceiling lower than the five percent allowed for developed countries. 
With respect to Wall Street’s unseemly push for fast access to China’s financial service markets, 
Stiglitz was to later argue that this approach was very short sighted (see Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 63) because 
(as the respected China scholar Nicholas Lardy has noted) from the service providers point of view 
China has ‘the world’s largest population and the highest savings rate of any major nation, the potential 
opportunities to provide banking, insurance, securities, and asset management...’. Nicholas R. Lardy, 
Integrating China into the Global Economy, Brookings Institution Press, 2002,  pp. 3 and  4 
 
11   Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 63 
 
12   See ‘WTO Entry to Promote Free Agricultural Market’, Xinhua, 15/05/2001, reproduced China 
Daily (in English) 15/05/2001 
 
13 At this point in the argument China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping’s views were invoked to re-
enforce the argument that no foreign country should expect China ‘to swallow the bitter pill of having 
its national interests harmed’. See ‘RMRB [Renmin Ribao] on Deng Xiaoping Diplomatic Thinking, 
PRC’s Foreign Affairs’, Renmin Ribao, Internet version, 13/07/2000, FBIS-CHI-200-0713 
 
14  Stiglitz has offered a further point of gain for the Chinese side in this agricultural 
subsidy/developing or developed country debate. He has pointed out that ‘in effect, unwittingly, the 
United States gave China the extra time it had wanted...while the United States insisted that China 
adjust quickly, as if it were a developed country - and because China had used the prolonged 
bargaining time well, it was able to accede to those demands.’ See Stiglitz, op. cit., p. 63. Stiglitz’s 
argument is reflected in Chinese commentators’ recognition that the policies adopted in China during 
the very long period of WTO qualification and particularly during the latter delays was used to good 
effect. See ‘Renmin Ribao Reviews WTO Process, Pros, Cons of Membership’, Renmin Ribao, 
14/11/2001 
 
15  See ‘Distorted World Trade Harms China‘s Farmers‘, Xinhuanet, 16/12/2005 and ‘China Improves 
International Trade Rules for Rural Development’, Xinhuanet, 18/12/2005 
 
16  Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO’, Zed Books, 2003, p. 5 and  
pp. 118-9. These authors have found support for their view in Bhagirath Das‘s work. (See Bhagirath 
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Lal Das, The World Trade Organisation, Zed Books, 1999. Das is an academic scholar and former 
Indian ambassador to the GATT). They cite his internet published article titled ‘The New WTO Work 
Programme’, 2002, Third World Network April 8th, www.twnside.org.sg/title/das.doc. See also 
‘Economies Press the Rich to Honour Their Pledge’, China Daily [in English], 27/12/2005 and ‘China 
Plays Positive Role in International Community’, Xinhuanet, 23/02/2006 
 
17 See World Trade Organisation, ‘News of the Doha Development Agenda’, WTO Current 
Negotiations - The Doha Texts, The post-Cancun July 2004 Package, and ‘Negotiations, 
Implementation and Development: the Doha Agenda’, The Doha Development Agenda - both available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm.  See also ‘WTO HK Meeting Circulates 
Draft Declaration’, China Daily (in English), 17/12/2005; ‘Developed Ones Urged to Cut Agricultural 
Subsidies’, China Daily (in English), 16/12/2005; Jawara and Kwa, op. cit., pp. 118-9 and ‘Minister 
Urges Assent to Market Status’, China Daily (in English), 08/06/2004; ‘Farm Subsidies Hold Key to 
Trade Talks’, China Daily (in English), 13/12/2005; ‘Needs of Developing Nations Stressed’, China 
Daily (in English), 13/12/2005; and ‘Least Developing Countries Crying for Help’, China Daily (in 
English), 16/12/2005 
 
18 For an excellent and more detailed account of the Cancun meeting see Anthony Payne, The Global 
Politics of Unequal Development, Palgrave, 2005, pp. 188-98 
 
19 It was not the Chinese government but the Hong Kong based Oxfam (non-government agency) 
group that first reported that the cotton subsidy that the United States government affords its country’s 
farmers has driven 720,000 Chinese cotton farmers out of work. This group also notes that the subsidy 
‘violates World Trade Organization rules’. See ‘Distorted World Trade Harms China’s Farmers’, op. 
cit. See also ‘Developed Ones Urged to Cut Agricultural Subsidies’, op. cit.; ‘WTO HK Meeting 
Circulates Draft Declaration’, ‘Progress Already Made in HK WTO: Spokesman’, and  ‘WTO 
Ministers Urged for Consensus’, all available on Xinhuanet, 17/12/2005  
 
* The April 30th deadline has now been breached and when Pascal Lamy was asked if this meant that 
the WTO was unlikely to be able to reach an agreement on agricultural subsidies and import tariffs on 
industrial goods with all the concerned parties he indicated that he continued to be confident that the 
agreement would eventually be reached. It was, he said, an agreement that was  merely subject to some 
difficulties and delays. Australian Broadcasting Corporation commentary 26th April 2006 
 
20 ‘WTO Members Urged to Jointly Help Small Nations’, Xinhua, 23/02/2006; ‘Progress Already 
Made in HK WTO: Spokesman’, op. cit., 17/12/2005; ‘WTO Deal on Farm Products Welcomed, China 
Daily [in English], 28/12/2005; ‘Ministers Seek Key Trade-offs for Doha Deal’, Xinhua, 29/01/2006; 
and ‘Lamy Says WTO Members Committed to Realizing Hong Kong Targets’, Xinhua, 08/02/2006 
 
21 ‘EU Proposes Anti-dumping Duties on Chinese Shoes’, Xinhuanet, 23/02/06 
 
22 China imposed tariffs on six categories of textile exports. The tariffs ‘mostly range[d] from 0.2 yuan 
to 0.3 yuan (2.4-3.6 US cents) [for] every piece or set. The tariff was said to be ‘a key policy... put into 
place by the Ministry of Commerce, to address the concerns of trade partners’. See ‘Textile Tariff 
Details Unveiled’, China Daily [in English], 28/12/2004 
 
23  A. S. Bhalla and Shufang Qiu, The Employment Impact of China’s WTO Accession, 
Routledge/Curzon, 2004, p. 16. See also Nicholas Lardy, op. cit., p. 82 
 
24 ‘China Opposes EU Probe into Shoe Imports’, China Daily [in English], 25/06/2005, ‘EU Safeguard 
Measures on Textiles Opposed’, China Daily [in English], 31/05/2005 
 
25 See ‘China’s Textiles Not a Threat’, and ‘China Hopes [for a] Smooth Transition of Textile 
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Integration’, People’s Daily Online [in English], 05/03/2005. See also ‘EU to Monitor China Textile 
Imports From 2005’ and  ‘Retailers Seek to Block US Curbs on Chinese Textiles’, both published in 
People’s Daily Online [in English], 23/03/2005 
 
26 See ‘China-US Trade Ties to Enter an Eventful Period, Expert’, People’s Daily Online, 08/02/2005 
 
27 ‘China, EU Trying to Resolve Textile Crisis’, China Daily [in English], 24/08/2005. It has been 
noted that at the time of the wharf crisis that ‘T-shirts, sweaters, trousers, blouses and bras are among 
as much as 400 million euros ($US488 million) of products that can’t enter Europe from China’. It was 
also recognised that retailers such as Hennes & Mauritz AB faced higher costs because of the quotas 
and that they were ‘joined by the Swedish and Dutch governments in arguing that orders paid for 
before the limits kicked in are being unfairly obstructed.’ See ‘Let in China Garments or Face 
Shortages, EU Tells Members’, China Daily [in English], 01/09/2005. See also ‘Official: US Response 
to Textile Talks Active’, China Daily [in English], 26/07/2005 
 
28  Mexico held out ‘until just before final approval of China’s accession’ to the WTO. With what may 
well prove to be a serious and well founded concern the Mexican government was worried that its 
country’s labour-intensive manufacturing sector would be unable to compete with China’s labour-
intensive sector. See Panitchpakdi and Clifford, op. cit., p. 76 
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